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Abstrat
This paper analyzes the impliations of right-to-manage wage bargaining between a
produers' syndiate and a workers' union representing nite numbers of idential members
in a monetary maroeonomi model of the ASAD type with government ativity. At
given pries and prie expetations, nominal wages are set aording to a Nash bargaining
agreement. Produers then hoose labor demand and ommodity supply to maximize
prots at given output pries. The ommodity market lears in a ompetitive fashion.
Unique temporary equilibria are shown to exist for eah level of relative power of the
union. These equilibria may exhibit under- or overemployment, depending on the level of
union power.
The paper presents a omplete omparative-statis analysis of the temporary equilib-
rium, in partiular of the role of union power on employment, wages, and inome distribu-
tion, inluding a variety of dierent qualitative features ompared to the situation under
eient bargaining. These dierenes arise primarily from a supply-side eet of union
power under the right-to-manage approah as ompared to a demand-side eet under
eient bargaining.
In addition, the dynami evolution under perfet foresight is monotoni with two o-
existing balaned steady states, one of whih is stable under ertain onditions. These
properties are qualitatively idential to those under eient bargaining or under perfet
ompetition.
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1 Introdution
In most (Western) eonomies, bargaining between workers' unions and produers' syndiates
about the wage level is a regular and re-ouring phenomenon, whih indues an endogenous
mehanism determining the wage rate and the level of employment in a nonompetitive fashion.
It is sometimes argued that high union power is beneial to workers and that it inreases
the level of employment, in partiular when bargaining ours over employment and wages
simultaneously.
Theoretial models on wage bargaining between a union and a produers' syndiate using
bargaining solutions à la Nash (1950, 1953) an be divided into two strands, depending on
whether the employment level is subjet of the bargain or not. The rst lass of models, in whih
wage and employment levels are determined simultaneously by the negotiating parties, are the
eient bargaining models (see, for example, MDonald & Solow 1981; Blanhard & Fisher
1993; Booth 1996). In these models, the rents from trading are eiently shared between the
agents. The seond lass onsists of models with wage bargaining only. Sine the produer
retains the right to hoose the size of the workfore one the wage has been set, it is alled the
right-to-manage approah. A speial ase is the monopoly union model, in whih the union
unilaterally sets the wage rate and the produer subsequently piks the employment level.
Supporters of eient bargaining argue that right-to-manage bargaining leads to ineienies as
pointed out by Leontief (1946) beause potential gains from trade remain unused by agents who
otherwise are assumed to behave rationally. Eient agreements, however, are rarely observed
empirially and their positive impliations are often ontested (Layard, Nikell & Jakman
2009; Layard & Nikell 1990). It is often unlear whether the dierent results for the two
bargaining senarios arise from spei assumptions about the bargaining struture used in the
labor market or whether they stem from the neglet of general-equilibrium eets, whih are
ignored in many partial-equilibrium presentations. Other reasons are related to the fat that a
union may represent only those who are already employed and not the workers to be hired in
the future, and that layos only aet a relatively small number of workers in a pre-assigned
order (e. g. aording to seniority). Therefore, the workers' objetive is not the aggregate size of
employment. Enforing eient bargaining agreements in a produers' syndiate with poten-
tially heterogeneous members is a further issue that prevents a wageemployment iuntim in
pratie. Surprisingly few ontributions to the literature work out the full general-equilibrium
eets of their partial-equilibriummodels. More importantly, however, they rarely disuss these
features within a dynami monetary maro model.
Starting from the ASAD model with ompetitive markets, Böhm & Claas (2012) provides
a miro-founded losed-eonomy ASAD model with eient bargaining on the labor market
while the ommodity market lears ompetitively. This paper embeds the right-to-manage wage
bargaining approah into the ASAD framework in a similar fashion. Setion 2 and Setion 3
lay out the miroeonomi foundations of all agents in the eonomy and model the labor market
with right-to-manage wage bargaining between a union and a produers' syndiate under full
unionization. Setion 4 loses the eonomy and analyzes the omparative-statis properties in
full general equilibrium for the maroeonomy. Setion 5 ompares the right-to-manage model
developed in the rst part of the paper with the ompetitive one and the eient-bargaining
model. Setion 6 analyzes the dynami evolution of the eonomy and its stability under perfet
foresight. Setion 7 onludes.
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2 Nash Bargaining under Right to Manage
The Publi Setor
The publi setor onsists of a government and a entral bank. The government demands g ≥ 0
units of the (homogenous) good produed and nanes its spendings by levying proportional
taxes 0 ≤ τπ ≤ 1 on prot inome resp. 0 ≤ τw ≤ 1 on wage inome. This implies that,
in general, the government's budget is not balaned. The entral bank reates resp. destroys
money, whih is the only intertemporal store of value for onsumers, aordingly.
The Prodution Setor
The prodution setor is made up of nf ≥ 1 homogeneous, prot-maximizing rms whih
produe from labor the same nonstorable good to be sold on the ompetitive ommodity market.
Eah rm has the twie ontinously dierentiable, stritly monotonially inreasing, stritly
onave, and invertible prodution funtion F : R+ → R+, z 7→ F (z), F (0) = 0, whih is
assumed to satisfy the Inada onditions, i. e.
lim
z→0
F ′(z) =∞ and lim
z→∞
F ′(z) = 0.
For a given a ommodity prie p, a wage rate w, and an employment level z ≥ 0, short-run
prots are given by Π(p, w, z) := pF (z)−wz, whih are paid entirely to the owners/shareholders
of the rm. The labor demand by a typial rm under ompetition is
h
om
(
w
p
)
:= argmax
z≥0
{pF (z)− wz} = (F ′)−1
(
w
p
)
,
whih is a stritly monotonially dereasing funtion of the real wage w/p. In nonompetitive
situations, the rm only hires workers if prodution leads to a nonnegative prot Π(p, w, z) =
pF (z)−wz ≥ 0. This onstitutes the rms' partiipation onstraint and denes the reservation
wage
WΠ(p, z) := p
F (z)
z
,
whih is the maximum wage the rm is willing to pay while produing.
The Consumption Setor
The onsumption setor onsists of overlapping generations of two types of onsumers  ns ho-
mogeneous shareholders and nw homogeneous workers , who all live for two onseutive peri-
ods. Every onsumer reeives inome only when young, i. e. all seond-period onsumption has
to be naned by savings. The future ommodity prie pe > 0 is given as a point foreast at
the beginning of the period and is the same for all onsumers.
The young shareholders reeive net prots of the rms. Their onsumptionsavings deision is
based on a homotheti utility funtion so that their propensity to onsume 0 ≤ c(θe) ≤ 1 is a
funtion of the expeted rate of ination θe := pe/p only.
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Every worker reeives inome only from working when young, whih he saves entirely. His
intertemporal utility for labor ℓ ≥ 0 and future onsumption ce ≥ 0 is given by an additively
separable indiret utility funtion u : R2+ → R+ with u(ℓ, c
e) := ce − v(ℓ) where v : R+ → R+
measures the disutility from labor.
1
The funtion v is assumed to be ontinuously dierentiable,
stritly monotonially inreasing, stritly onvex, and invertible, and it satises v′(0) = 0 as
well as limℓ→∞ v
′(ℓ) = ∞. Under ompetitive onditions, the utility-maximizing labor supply
is
argmax
ℓ≥0
{
u
(
ℓ, (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ
)}
= (v′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
,
whih is globally dened and invertible sine v is stritly onvex and satieses the Inada on-
ditions. Sine any positive level of work indues disutility, his utility funtion implies a parti-
ipation onstraint
u(0, 0) = 0 ≤ u
(
ℓ, (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ
)
= (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ− v(ℓ),
i. e. a pair of positive labor supply and future onsumption must be at least as good as not
working. Solving for w/pe yields the individual reservation wage as a funtion of the amount
of labor ℓ
w
pe
=
1
1− τw
v(ℓ)
ℓ
whih is the minimal wage below whih he is not willing to work the amount ℓ.
With nw workers, the aggregate ompetitive labor supply is given by
N
om
(
w
pe
)
= nwℓ = nw(v
′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
,
whih has a global inverse
w
pe
= S
om
(L) :=
1
1− τw
v′
(
L
nw
)
under the assumption that all nw workers are treated equally on the labor market. Similarly,
the aggregate reservation wage is given by
w
pe
= S(L) :=
nw
L(1− τw)
v
(
L
nw
)
.
Therefore,
WΩ(p
e, L) := peS(L)
onstitutes the aggregate partiipation onstraint in nominal terms. Due to the properties of v,
the aggregate reservation wage is a stritly inreasing funtion of the aggregate employment
level with well-dened inverse N : R+ → R+, mapping the expeted real wage w/p
e
into an
employment level N(w/pe). This funtion also is stritly monotonially inreasing with full
range.
1
Assuming intertemporal onsumption to be homotheti (as in the ase of the shareholders) allows for a
generalized onsumptionsavings behavior.
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3 Wage Bargaining and Employment
The entire work fore is assumed to be represented by a union whih negotiates a uniform wage
rate for all its members, maximizing the aggregate exess wage bill
Ω(pe, w, L) := wL− peS(L)L = (w −WΩ(p
e, L))L.
The union is engaged in a Nash bargain with all rms simultaneously (or with an employers'
union) over the wage rate only; the employment deision is then left the rms (the so-alled right
to manage of the rm). Thus, the bargaining proedure is a two-stage game. In the rst stage,
the bargaining parties agree on a wage rate for given levels of employment, pries, and prie
expetations. In the seond stage, every rm hooses a prot-maximizing level of employment
equal to h
om
(w/p). As is ustomary in suh models, the relative bargaining power of the union
is given by a number 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 while the rms are endowed with bargaining power 1 − λ.
Sine this behavior is antiipated by the bargaining parties, the game is solved by bakward
indution. The bargaining wage is therefore suh that it maximizes
NP (w,L, λ) subjet to
Ω(pe, w, L) ≥ 0 and L = nfhom(w/p)
(1)
where
NP (w,L, λ) :=
(
nfΠ
(
p, w,
L
nf
))1−λ
(Ω (pe, w, L))λ
=
(
nfpF
(
L
nf
)
− wL︸ ︷︷ ︸
agg. prots  employers' union
)1−λ(
wL− peS(L)L︸ ︷︷ ︸
agg. exess wage bill
)λ
is the asymmetri Nash produt. Figure 1 displays the set of feasible payos and one level
urve of the asymmetri Nash produt.
PSfrag replaements
0
0 Π
Ω
λ = 0.00
λ = 0.25
λ = 1.00
Figure 1: The set of feasible payos; blue: ontour of the Nash produt for λ = 0.25
Volker Böhm & Oliver Claas Right-to-Manage Wage Bargaining
3 WAGE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYMENT 7
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique solution to the bargaining problem (1). This solution
is indued by a unique wage rate (or, equivalently, a unique employment level).
Proof. The existene of a unique bargaining solution follows from the onvexity of the set of
feasible payos (Lemma A.1) and from the strit onvexity of the asymmetri Nash produt.
Beause of the monotoniity of the prot funtion, there exists a unique wage rate or a unique
employment level that indue this solution.
To simplify notation, let α := w/p denote the real wage and dene the real Nash produt as
N˜P (α, θe, λ) :=
(
nfΠ
(
1, α,
L
nf
))1−λ
(Ω (θe, α, L))λ subjet to
Ω (θe, α, L) ≥ 0 and L = nfhom(α).
(2)
Beause of
argmax
w≥0
{
NP
(
w, nfhom
(
w
p
)
, λ
)}
= argmax
w≥0
{
1
p
NP
(
w, nfhom
(
w
p
)
, λ
)}
= argmax
w≥0
{
N˜P
(
w
p
,
pe
p
, λ
)}
= p arg max
w/p≥0
{
N˜P
(
w
p
,
pe
p
, λ
)}
,
i. e., for given (pe, p)≫ 0, the maximizer of the asymmetri Nash produt in nominal terms (1)
is p times the maximizer of asymmetri Nash produt in real terms (2), dene
W
rtm
: R+ × [0, 1]→ R+, Wrtm(θ
e, λ) := argmax
α≥0
{
N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∣∣Ω (θe, α, nfhom(α)) ≥ 0}
(3)
whih is the real wage that maximizes the asymmetri Nash produt subjet to a nonnegative
level of the net wage billΩ (note that the produers' right to manage always leads to individually
rational solutions for produers due to the monotoniity of the prot funtion) and thus indues
the bargaining solution.
In the boundary ase of no union power λ = 0 and for (pe, p) ≫ 0 given, the asymmet-
ri Nash produt is equal to aggregate prots, whih are stritly monotonially dereasing
in α and unbounded, implying that the onstraint has to bind. Rewriting the ondition
Ω(θe, α, h
om
(α)) = 0 leads to N(α/θe) = nfhom(α), i. e. the real wage is hosen at the level
at whih the workers' maximal labor supply (their partiipation onstraint or threshold level)
and the prot-maximizing employment level are equalized.
For (pe, p)≫ 0 and 0 < λ ≤ 1 given, the objetive funtion depends on the net wage bill so that
the asymmetri Nash produt attains positive values if and only if the onstraint is not binding,
i. e. in the ase of an interior solution. Writing L = nfhom(α), the rst-order ondition is
0
!
=
∂N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∂α
=
(
λ
Ω(θe, α, L)
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα
+
1− λ
Π(1, α, L/nf)
dΠ(1, α, L/nf)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−L
)
N˜P (α, θe, λ),
(4)
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PSfrag replaements
0
0 L
w
λ = 0.25
λ = 0.75
WΩ
(WΩL)
′ = peS
om
(L)
WΠ
(WΠL)
′ = pF ′(L/nf)
Figure 2: The bargaining solution given p, pe; blue: ontours of the Nash produt for λ = 0.25
resp. λ = 0.75
It requires that, in absolute terms, normalized marginal union utility equals normalized aggre-
gate prots, weighted by the relative power of the parties. Sine the (Ω(θe, α, L)/N˜P (α, θe, λ))-
multiple of the right-hand side is linear in θe and λ, this ondition an be expliitly solved for
θe and λ, but only impliitly denes the real wage α.
In order to formulate properties of the real wage W
rtm
(θe, λ), one assumption on the urvature
of N˜P is stated.
Assumption 3.1. Let α be a loal extremum of the asymmetri Nash produt N˜P suh that
the seond derivative of N˜P is bounded from above by
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2 < −(θe/α)∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α∂θe.
Lemma 3.1. The following statements hold true.
1. Under the assumptions on the prodution funtion F (z) and the disutility of labor v(ℓ),
the real wage W
rtm
(θe, λ) is stritly monotonially inreasing in both arguments.
2. If Assumption 3.1 holds, the elastiity of the real wage with respet to expeted ination
is bounded by unity, i. e. EW
rtm
(θe) < 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Figure 2 provides a geometri haraterization of the bargaining solution for two alternative
levels of union power. Observe that for eah λ, the Nash produt denes a family of onentri
ontours in (L,w) spae with a unique global maximum. Due to the fat that the produer
hooses a level of prodution where the real wage is equal to the marginal produt, the bar-
gaining solution for eah λ is given by a tangeny ondition of the marginal produt urve and
a level urve of the assoiated Nash produt.
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Underemployment and Overemployment
Sine both parties agree on the wage rate knowing that the resulting level of employment is
equal to the orresponding ompetitive labor demand nfhom(w/p), there annot be involun-
tary unemployment. Any deviation of the employment level nfhom(w/p) from the desired
supply N
om
(w/pe) has to be a measure of voluntary underemployment. Therefore, dene the
underemployment rate as
U
(
L,
w
pe
)
:=
N
om
(w/pe)− L
N
om
(w/pe)
= 1−
L
N
om
(w/pe)
.
It measures the gap between the atual employment and the aggregate amount whih the
workers would supply at the given wage level. Negative rates of underemployment are inter-
preted as voluntary overemployment or overtime. Thus, under right-to-manage bargaining, the
underemployment rate oinides with the (perentage) Walrasian exess supply, i. e.
U
rtm
(
w
p
,
w
pe
)
:= 1−
nfhom(w/p)
N
om
(w/pe)
.
In Figure 2, the level of under- or overemployment an be read o diretly as the horizontal
distane of the bargainig solution on the marginal produt urve to the ompetitive labor supply
N
om
(w/pe).
4 Employment in Temporary Equilibrium
After having derived the right-to-manage bargaining wage pW
rtm
(pe/p, λ) and the indued
employment level nfhom(Wrtm(p
e/p, λ)) as funtions of pries, prie expetations, and the
bargaining parameter λ in the previous setion, it is straightforward to lose the model in order
to determine the properties of a temporary equilibrium under right-to-manage wage bargaining.
The data at the beginning of an arbitrary period is aggregate money balanes M ≥ 0 held by
old onsumers, prie expetations pe > 0, and the bargaining parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
4.1 Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand
Sine every rm is a prie taker on the ompetitive ommodity market, aggregate ommodity
supply is that level of prodution indued by the bargaining agreement W
rtm
(θe, λ), i. e. it is
dened by
AS
rtm
(θe, λ) := nfF (hom(Wrtm(θ
e, λ))) .
This funtion is stritly monotonially dereasing in both arguments
∂AS
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂θe
= nfF
′ (h
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ)))h′
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ))
∂W
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂θe
< 0
resp.
∂AS
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂λ
= nfF
′ (h
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ)))h′
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ))
∂W
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂λ
< 0.
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Sine the wage paid by the produer under the right to manage always equals the marginal
produt of prodution, the share of total revenue allotted to the workers is
wL
py
=
F ′(L/nf )L
nfF (L/nf)
= EF
(
L
nf
)
, with L = nfhom(Wrtm(θ
e, λ))
while
π
py
= 1− EF (hom(Wrtm(θ
e, λ)))
is paid to the shareholders. Sine only the latter group onsumes when young, the inome-
onsistent aggregate ommodity demand must solve
yd =
M
p
+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ)
π
pyd
=
M
p
+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− EF (hom(Wrtm(θ
e, λ))))yd.
Therefore, the inome-onsistent aggregate demand funtion is given by
D
rtm
(m, θe, λ) :=
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− EF (hom(Wrtm(θe, λ))))
,
(5)
whih is of the usual multiplier form with respet to real money balanes m := M/p and
government demand g.2 Compared to the situation with eient bargaining, as disussed in
Böhm & Claas (2012), the union power parameter λ enters only indiretly into the multiplier
through the elastiity of prodution under the right to manage. Therefore, if EF is onstant,
there is neither an eet of union power λ on the inome distribution nor on aggregate demand.
In other words, large union power indues a large deviation of employment from the assoiated
ompetitive labor supply with almost no impat on aggregate inome distribution while, under
eient bargaining, the union power is in a one-to-one orrespondene of the relative inome
distribution between wages and prots.
While aggregate demand is obviously inreasing in real money holdings m, i. e. ∂D
rtm
/∂m > 0,
with an elastiity ED
rtm
(m) = m/(m+ g) < 1 less than one, the eets of a hange of expeted
ination θe annot be signed in general. If ∂D
rtm
/∂θe ≥ 0 holds, aggregate demand is stritly
monotonially dereasing in the ommodity prie p, i. e. dD
rtm
/dp < 0. In the ase of an
isoelasti prodution funtion, the ondition ∂D
rtm
/∂θe ≥ 0 is equivalent to c′ ≤ 0.
Denition 4.1. A temporary equilibrium is a pair (p, w) ≫ 0 of pries and wages whih
simultaneously lears the ommodity and the labor market. The levels at whih both markets
are leared are the temporary equilibrium alloations (y, L) = (nfF (L/nf), L)≫ 0 of aggregate
output and aggregate employment.
Sine the labor market has been internalized in the aggregate supply funtion, the temporary
equilibrium, given (M, pe, λ), is haraterized by a prie p whih lears the ommodity market,
i. e.
D
rtm
(
M
p
,
pe
p
, λ
)
= AS
rtm
(
pe
p
, λ
)
. (6)
2
If workers onsume when young, a term depending on the net onsumption propensity and on the elastiity
of prodution has to be added to the multiplier.
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Figure 3: Temporary equilibrium for dierent levels of union power (with ∂D
rtm
/∂λ = 0)
Lemma 4.1. Let the aggregate supply funtion AS
rtm
be globally invertible and stritly mono-
tonially dereasing with respet to expeted ination, and assume that ∂D
rtm
/∂m > 0 and
∂D
rtm
/∂θe ≥ 0 hold. Then, for every (M, pe)≫ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, there exists a unique positive
temporary equilibrium prie p > 0 solving (6).
Proposition 4.1. Under the assumptions of Lemma 4.1, there exists a dierentiable mapping
P
rtm
: R2++ × [0, 1]→ R++, alled the prie law, suh that the unique positive equilibrium prie
is given by
p = P
rtm
(M, pe, λ).
The prie law is homogeneous of degree one in (M, pe), for given λ.
4.2 Properties of the Equilibrium Mappings
In order to derive properties of the prie law and the assoiated equilibrium mappings, as-
sume for the remainder of this setion that the aggregate demand funtion is nondereasing in
expeted ination and union power, i. e. ∂D
rtm
/∂θe ≥ 0 and ∂D
rtm
/∂λ ≥ 0, and that Assump-
tion 3.1 is fullled, i. e. the elastiity of the real wage funtion W
rtm
is less than one.
Properties of the Prie Law
Applying the Impliit Funtion Theorem to (6) with respet to M yields
∂P
rtm
∂M
= −
− 1
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂m
− θ
e
P
rtm
∂AS
rtm
∂θe
+ m
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂m
+ θ
e
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂θe
=
∂D
rtm
∂m
−θe ∂ASrtm
∂θe
+m∂Drtm
∂m
+ θ
e
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂θe
> 0
and
0 < EP
rtm
(M) =
∂P
rtm
∂M
M
P
rtm
=
m∂Drtm
∂m
−θe ∂ASrtm
∂θe
+m∂Drtm
∂m
+ θe ∂Drtm
∂θe
< 1,
Volker Böhm & Oliver Claas Right-to-Manage Wage Bargaining
4 EMPLOYMENT IN TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIUM 12
whih shows that higher money balanes indue higher pries with a positive elastiity less than
one. Similar alulations yield
∂P
rtm
∂pe
= −
1
P
rtm
∂AS
rtm
∂θe
− θ
e
P
rtm
∂AS
rtm
∂θe
+ m
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂m
+ θ
e
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂θe
=
−∂ASrtm
∂θe
−θe ∂ASrtm
∂θe
+m∂Drtm
∂m
+ θe ∂Drtm
∂θe
> 0
and
0 < EP
rtm
(pe) =
∂P
rtm
∂pe
pe
P
rtm
=
−θe ∂ASrtm
∂θe
−θe ∂ASrtm
∂θe
+m∂Drtm
∂m
+ θe ∂Drtm
∂θe
< 1
whih, as for money holdings, is less than unit-elasti.
Output and Employment
Given the prie law P
rtm
(M, pe, λ), the assoiated temporary equilibrium alloations are
y = Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ) := AS
rtm
(
pe
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
, λ
)
≡ D
rtm
(
M
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
,
pe
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
, λ
)
,
whih is the aggregate level of output traded at the temporary equilibrium prie P
rtm
(M, pe, λ),
and
L = L
rtm
(M, pe, λ) := nfF
−1
(
1
nf
Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
)
= nfhom
(
W
rtm
(
pe
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
, λ
))
,
whih is the employment level it takes to produe Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ). Due to the homogeneity of
the prie law, both mappings are homogenous of degree zero in (M, pe). Furthermore, they
are stritly monotonially inreasing (resp. dereasing) with respet to money holdings (resp.
expetations).
0 < EY
rtm
(M) = −EAS
rtm
(θe)EP
rtm
(M) =
−EAS
rtm
(θe)ED
rtm
(m)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
<
−EAS
rtm
(θe)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
< 1
0 < EL
rtm
(M) = EF−1(y/nf)EY
rtm
(M)
0 > EY
rtm
(pe) = EAS
rtm
(θe)(1− EP
rtm
(pe)) > EAS
rtm
(θe)
0 > EL
rtm
(pe) = EF−1(y/nf)EY
rtm
(pe)
Inreasing levels of money holdings (resp. prie expetations) indue higher (resp. lower) levels
of output and employment.
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Properties of the Wage Law
Inserting the prie law P
rtm
into the wage funtion (3) yields the wage law
w =W
rtm
(M, pe, λ) := P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)W
rtm
(
pe
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
, λ
)
,
whih shows that it enompasses the general-equilibrium prie feedbak from the ommodity
market. Due to the homogeneity of the prie law, the wage law is also homogenous of degree
one in (M, pe). Eets stemming from dierent levels of money holdings and prie expetations
on the wage rate an be alulated in the same fashion as before.
EW
rtm
(M) = EP
rtm
(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
(1−EW
rtm
(θe))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
∈ (0, EP
rtm
(M)) ⊂ (0, 1),
EW
rtm
(pe) = EP
rtm
(pe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
+EW
rtm
(θe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
(1−EP
rtm
(pe))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
∈ (EP
rtm
(pe), 1) ⊂ (0, 1),
i. e. nominal wages are inreasing in money holdings and expetations while real wages are
only inreasing in prie expetations, but dereasing in money holdings. Therefore, all eets
of these two variables on the temporary equilibrium mappings have the same signs and are
similar in size as in the related set-ups with ompetitve markets (Böhm 2010) or with eient
bargaining (Böhm & Claas 2012).
The Role of Union Power
Applying the Impliit Funtion Theorem to (6) with respet to λ yields
∂P
rtm
∂λ
= −
∂AS
rtm
∂λ
− ∂Drtm
∂λ
− θ
e
P
rtm
∂AS
rtm
∂θe
+ m
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂m
+ θ
e
P
rtm
∂D
rtm
∂θe
> 0,
i. e. a higher level of union power results in a higher equilibrium prie. This marks the major
dierene between the right-to-manage and the eient-bargaining model where the prie eet
was stritly negative under the same assumptions for the onsumption setor.
However, the eets of λ on the equilibrium alloations annot be signed, in general. Sine the
two elastiities on the alloation are given by
EY
rtm
(λ) = − (ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
EP
rtm
(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ED
rtm
(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
EL
rtm
(λ) = EF−1(y/nf)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
EY
rtm
(λ),
an inrease in union power indues a mixed eet on output and employment. If the inuene of
union power on aggregate demand is small and an be negleted, output and employment levels
are stritly monotonially dereasing in λ, as under eient bargaining. Under an isoelasti
prodution funtion, aggregate demand is independent of union power. This ase has been
depited in the left panel of Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Range of pries, output, and wages for λ ∈ [0, 1] (with ∂D
rtm
/∂λ = 0)
Finally, one obtains for the elastiity of the wage law with respet to λ
EW
rtm
(λ) = EP
rtm
(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1−EW
rtm
(θe))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
+EW
rtm
(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0,
whih shows that the equilibrium wage rate is always inreasing in λ. If ED
rtm
(λ) is suiently
small, even the real wage is inreasing in bargaining power.
EW
rtm
(λ)− EP
rtm
(λ) = EW
rtm
(λ)− EP
rtm
(λ)EW
rtm
(θe)
= EW
rtm
(λ)−
−EAS
rtm
(λ) + ED
rtm
(λ)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
EW
rtm
(θe)
=
−1
EF (z)Eh
om
(α)
(
(−EAS
rtm
(λ) + ED
rtm
(λ))EAS
rtm
(θe)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
− EAS
rtm
(λ)
)
=
−1
EF (z)Eh
om
(α)
EAS
rtm
(θe)ED
rtm
(λ)− EAS
rtm
(λ)(ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe))
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
≈
−1
EF (z)Eh
om
(α)
−EAS
rtm
(λ)(ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe))
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m) + ED
rtm
(θe)
> 0
Sine the equilibrium prie and wage are determined simultaneously with (6), it is possible
to derive an equivalent geometri representation in priewage spae to investigate the role of
union power. The Inada onditions for the prodution funtion guarantee that the equilibrium
ondition (6) an be written equivalently as
pF ′
(
nfF
−1
(
D
rtm
(M/p, pe/p, λ)
nf
))
!
= pF ′
(
nfF
−1
(
AS
rtm
(pe/p, λ)
nf
))
,
dening the equilibrium onguration in (p, w) spae. The graph of the left funtion de-
pits the demand-onsistent wage while the graph of the right funtion denes the supply-
onsistent wage under right-to-manage bargaining. Their intersetion yields the equilibrium
values (P
rtm
(M, pe, λ),W
rtm
(M, pe, λ)), as shown in the right panel of Figure 4 and an inrease
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M pe λ
P
rtm
+ + +
W
rtm
+ + +
W
rtm
/P
rtm
− + (+)
Y
rtm
+ − (−)
L
rtm
+ − (−)
Table 1: Summary of omparative-statis analysis (for ∂D
rtm
/∂λ suiently small)
of λ inreases both the equilibrium prie and wage. This ontrasts with the ase under eient
bargaining where the wage rate an be dereasing under some irumstanes (see Böhm & Claas
2012). Table 1 summarizes the results of the omparative-statis analysis.
It is informative to onsider the global eet of the role of union power on wages and em-
ployment, respetively, on underemployment/overemployment. Figure 5 shows the range of
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ements
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Figure 5: Range of employment and wages for λ ∈ [0, 1]
bargaining equilibria as the union parameter hanges from zero to one. This denes a urve
in (L,w) spae for any pair (M, pe), whih rosses the ompetitive labor supply funtion at a
point where for the assoiated λ, the bargaining solution must oinide with the ompetitive
solution. In other words, the ompetitive equilibrium of the eonomy is the outome of the
temporary equilibrium under right-to-manage bargaining for a partiular value λ
om
of bar-
gaining power. Sine the eet of λ on this urve is suh that it rosses the ompetitive labor
supply transversely, the level λ
om
is uniquely determined. Simultaneously, the diagram shows
that this bargaining solution is the only temporary equilibrium under right to manage that has
zero unemployment, in other words, for λ > λ
om
, there is underemployment and for λ < λ
om
,
there is overemployment.
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Finally, the role of union power on equilibrium payos, i. e.
Π
rtm
(M, pe, λ) := P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)nfF
(
L
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
nf
)
−W
rtm
(M, pe, λ)L
rtm
(M, pe, λ),
Ω
rtm
(M, pe, λ) :=W
rtm
(M, pe, λ)L
rtm
(M, pe, λ)− peS(L
rtm
(M, pe, λ))L
rtm
(M, pe, λ),
an be analyzed. However, it seems that no lear qualitative results an be established under
the general set of assumptions beause of multiple eets in opposite diretions, unless more
spei assumptions are made, as done in the following setion.
4.3 A Parametri Example: the Isoelasti Case
In order to derive spei results on payos to disuss welfare issues, and to allow for a ompar-
ison with the model with eient bargaining (Böhm & Claas 2012), onsider the model with
a onstant propensity to onsume 0 < c < 1 as well as with isoelasti prodution and labor
supply funtions. Let
v(ℓ) =
C
C + 1
ℓ1+
1
C , 0 < C < 1,
be the disutility from labor and let
F (z) =
A
B
zB, A > 0, 0 < B < 1,
be the prodution funtion. This implies that the reservation wage funtion and the inverse
ompetitive labor supply are isoelasti funtions of the form
S(L) =
C
C + 1
1
1− τw
(
L
nw
)1/C
and S
om
(L) =
1
1− τw
(
L
nw
)1/C
.
Solving the bargaining problem, one obtains an expliit form the real wage funtion (3) given
by
W
rtm
(θe, λ) = A
1
C(1−B)+1
(
nf
nw
) 1−B
C(1−B)+1
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
)
1
1− τw
θe
) C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
,
whih is itself an isoelasti funtion in expeted ination. Sine the prodution funtion is
isoelasti, the aggregate supply funtion is isoelasti as well.
The aggregate demand funtion (5) is given by
D
rtm
(m) =
m+ g
1− c(1− τπ)(1−B)
,
whih is independent of expeted ination and bargaining power.
3
Then, given (M, pe, λ), the
temporary equilibrium prie p = P
rtm
(M, pe, λ) is impliitly dened by
AS
rtm
(
pe
p
, λ
)
= D
rtm
(
M
p
)
.
3
First-period onsumption of workers would result in an additional summand in the multiplier depending on
their net propensity to onsume.
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M pe λ
P
rtm
+ + +
W
rtm
+ + +
W
rtm
/P
rtm
− + +
Y
rtm
, L
rtm
, Π
rtm
/P
rtm
+ − −
P
rtm
Y
rtm
, Π
rtm
, W
rtm
L
rtm
+ + +
Ω
rtm
+ + +
Π
rtm
+Ω
rtm
+ + +
Table 2: Comparative-statis eets in the isoelasti example
In spite of the fat that the bargaining wage and employment level an be derived as expliit
isoelasti funtions for the partial equilibrium, it is impossible to obtain expliit algebrai
expressions for the general-equilibrium values. This is due to the fat that struturally aggregate
demand is not an isoelasti funtion whenever government demand is positive. Nevertheless,
standard numerial proedures allow an expliit numerial and geometri analysis to portray
orretly the properties of the respetive general-equilibrium solutions. Furthermore, almost all
omparative-statis eets an be alulated. They are derived in Setion B.1 in the Appendix
and their results are summarized in Table 2. The upper part of the table onrms the eets
derived for the general ase. Line 5 through line 7 indiate that all three state variables
(M, pe, λ) show overall positive eets for the nominal variables of the bargaining problem,
i. e. total inome, total prots, and total wage inome are monotonially inreasing in money
balanes, expetations, and union power. Notie however that exept for money balanes, these
ome at the ost of lower output and lower employment. Therefore, in partiular, an inrease
in union power inreases wage inome and prots, but it lowers employment.
The strong and universal monetary eets of union power under the right to manage ontrasts
with many of the ndings of the literature, whih are mainly derived under partial-equilibrium
reasoning and at given pries. As shown, the general-equilibrium prie feedbak through the
ommodity market plays the deisive role in generating the nominal eets for the maroeon-
omy. Therefore, an evaluation of the impat of union power under the right to manage must
reognize the positive prie spillover between the labor market and the ommodity market,
whih determines the size and diretion of all omparative-statis eets in the eonomy from
union power.
The isoelasti speiations not only allow to determine the eets of the state variables on the
temporary equilibrium under right-to-manage wage bargaining, but also for a omparison with
the related models with ompetition resp. eient bargaining on the labor market. In order
to distinguish between the dierent equilibrium mappings, the aggregate supply and demand
funtions, et., whih are assoiated with the dierent models, the subsripts e (eient
bargaining), om (ompetition), and rtm (right to manage) are used in the following. Sine
D
rtm
(
M
p
)
≡ D
om
(
M
p
)
≡ D
e
(
M
p
,
B
C(1− B) + 1
)
and
AS
rtm
(
pe
p
,
B
C(1− B) + 1
)
≡ AS
om
(
pe
p
)
≡ AS
e
(
pe
p
)
,
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the equilibrium onditions of all three models oinide at the level of bargaining power λ =
B/(C(1 − B) + 1) for any given (M, pe). Furthermore, alloations, wages, and the rates of
underemployment of the three models are the same at λ = B/(C(1 − B) + 1). Therefore,
λ
om
, whih has been impliitly dened as the level of bargaining power at whih the rate of
underemployment under the right to manage is zero, is expliitly given by
λ
om
=
B
C(1−B) + 1
.
Sine the ompetitive equilibrium oinides with the one of the right-to-manage model and of
the eient-bargaining model for the speial ase λ = λ
om
, hanges of money holdings and prie
expetations indue eets of the same sign in both models. Similar global omparative-statis
eets an be established for the eient-bargaining model for every value of λ.
5 Union Power and the Maroeonomy
While equilibrium alloations and wages under eent bargaining resp. right-to-manage wage
bargaining move in the same diretion and only dier in magnitude if the union's bargaining
power λ hanges, the equilibrium prie moves in opposite diretions. An inrease of union power
auses P
e
to derease, but P
rtm
to inrease. This astonishing fat, visualized in Figure 6,
4
omes from the dierent hannels through whih λ aets the temporary equilibrium. Sine all
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Figure 6: The role of union power on pries: right to manage (red), eient bargaining (green)
three models oinide for λ = λ
om
, the red (dark) and the green (light grey) urve in Figure 6
interset at this level of union power with pries not being equal for any other value of λ.
To understand why equilibrium alloations under the two bargaining regimes are similarly
aeted by a hange of bargaining power, onsider the geometry displayed in Figure 7. In the
4
The results are summarized in geometri form to avoid long tedious alulations. All diagrams are drawn
to sale for the values of the parameters given in Table 3. Under this parameterization, λ
om
= 0.5.
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A B C τπ τw nf nw c g M p
e λ
1 0.6 0.5 0.68 0.68 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.33 1 0.5
Table 3: The parametrization used in the diagrams
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Figure 7: Pries and output: right to manage vs. eient bargaining; λ ∈ [0, 1]
left panel, the aggregate supply funtion is negatively aeted by λ while aggregate demand
remains unhanged. Therefore, an inrease of union power results in a prie inrease while
aggregate output (and thus employment) go down. In the right panel, ommodity supply is
independent of bargaining power while aggregate demand dereases in λ, whih implies that
both pries and output (and employment) deline in bargaining power, onrming that the
same sign of the real impat, but an opposite one on pries.
Figure 8 shows the omparison of the equilibrium alloations in the spae of aggregate employ-
ment and wages. As expeted, the urve under right to manage (the bold red (dark) line) and
under eient bargaining (the green (light grey) line) interset on the inverse ompetitive la-
bor supply urve for λ = λ
om
. Sine bargaining power negatively aets equilibrium aggregate
employment and (usually) positively aets the equilibrium bargaining wage, both urves are
dereasing in (L,w) spae. Under the hosen parametrization, the dispersion of employment
levels is bigger under right to manage while the wage dispersion is bigger under eient bar-
gaining with the eient bargaining urve lying loser to the labor supply urve. However,
this observation heavily depends on the parametrization hosen and is reversed for high values
of prie expetations pe. Surprisingly, the outomes under the two regimes for any given level
of λ indue the same level of underemployment (visualized by the blak isounderemployment
urves). In order to show that the underemployment rates oinide, rst note that
W
rtm
(θe, λ) =
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)) C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
W
rtm
(θe, λ
om
).
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Figure 8: Employment and wages: right to manage vs. eient bargaining; λ ∈ [0, 1]
Then
N
om
(
W
rtm
(θe, λ)
θe
)
=
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
))C C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
N
om
(
W
rtm
(θe, λ
om
)
θe
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h
om
(W
rtm
(θe,λ
om
))
=
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
))(C+ 11−B ) C(1−B)C(1−B)+1
h
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ))
=
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
))C
h
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ))
implies that the rate of underemployment is independent of expeted ination
U
rtm
(.) = 1−
h
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ))
N
om
(W
rtm
(θe, λ)/θe)
= 1−
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
))−C
= U
e
(.)
and equal to the rate of underemployment under eient bargaining, i. e. for a given λ, the
employmentwage outomes of the two models are loated on the same isounderemployment
urve. This result, however, strongly depends on the isoelasti struture.
Finally, the impat of the bargaining power λ on equilibrium payos in the two senarios also
diers in a most surprising fashion, shown in Figure 9. Under eient bargaining, there is a
negative tradeo between prots and the exess wage bill (in fat, Ω an even be dereasing for
some parameterizations) with a maximal joint surplus for λ = 0. In ontrast, under the right to
manage, both payos are inreasing funtions in the bargaining power. While this result seems
ounterintuitive at rst sight, it an be explained realling that prots always are a onstant
fration of aggregate returns (i. e. of GNP). These are inreasing in union power under the right
to manage beause of the positive eet of λ on pries, whih overompensates the redution of
the prodution level. Furthermore, this rationale implies that real prots must derease when λ
goes up.
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Figure 9: Prots and net wage bill: right to manage vs. eient bargaining
Figure 10 provides an alternative explanation of this dierene of the prie feedbak in the
two ases. For λ = λ
om
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply funtions are idential
under the two bargaining regimes and under ompetition, leaving unlear how the objetives
look like here. The point in whih all equilibria oinide lies on a unique (and thus mutual)
Nash produt ontour. Hene, the slopes of the two thin blak pereived payo urves and the
blue Nash produt ontour must also be the same at this point, namely minus one. Due to
the respetive urvature properties, the pereived payo under eient bargaining, whih is a
line with slope minus one, must be a separating hyperplane between the pereived payo urve
under the right to manage and the Nash produt level set.
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Figure 10: Comparing payos: right to manage vs. eient bargaining
Due to the inverse relationship of aggregate payo and bargaining power in the two senarios,
it is interesting to disover that there exist payo-equivalent equilibria at dierent levels of
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union power in the two ases. Starting from λ
e
= λ
om
= λ
rtm
for whih the aggregate surplus
oinides, ontinuity implies that there exist levels of bargaining power
λ
e
< λ
om
< λ
rtm
suh that the assoiated equilibrium payos yield the same (but higher) level of aggregate sur-
plus at dierent supporting pries and dierent Nash produt ontours, as shown on Figure 11.
A symmetri argument an be shown to hold for λ
e
> λ
om
> λ
rtm
with an aggregate surplus
PSfrag replaements
0
0 Π
Ω
om
λ = 0
λ = 1
λ = 0
λ = 1
Figure 11: λ
rtm
> λ
e
indue the same aggregate payo
below the one at the ompetitive level.
6 Dynamis of Monetary Equilibrium under
Perfet Foresight
Given the fat that money balanes and expetations are the two essential parameters de-
termining a temporary equilibrium at eah date in time t, a desription of the dynamis of
monetary equilibria of suh eonomies requires a haraterization of the dynami evolution of
money balanes and expetation, assuming that the level of union power λ remains onstant
over time. In this ASAD eonomy with government ativity but without monetary transfers,
nal (next period's initial) money holdings in eah period are equal to aggregate savings, i. e.
Mt+1 := (1− τw)wtLt + (1− c(θ
e
t,t+1))(1− τπ)πt,
where the temporary equilibrium pries, wages, alloations are given/determined by their re-
spetive equilibrium mappings as funtions of (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ). The inome onsisteny ptyt =
Mt + ptg + c(θ
e
t,t+1)(1− τπ)πt implies that money balanes an be rewritten as
Mt+1 = Mt + ptg −
(
1− (1− τw)
wtLt
ptyt
− (1− τπ)
πt
ptyt
)
ptyt,
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showing that the hange of money holdings from period t to t + 1 equals the deit/surplus
of the publi budget where the term in parenthesis denes the average tax rate on aggregate
inome. Rewriting the tax rate and using the fat that under right-to-manage bargaining, the
labor share of wages oinides with the elastiity of the prodution funtion, one obtains a
funtion of (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
τ˜ (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ) := 1− (1− τw)EF (Lt/nf)− (1− τπ)(1−EF (Lt/nf))
= (τw − τπ)EF (Lt/nf) + τπ,
whose values are always between 0 and 1.5 Therefore, aggregate savings an be written as
Mt+1 = Mt + pt(g − τ˜ (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)yt)
= Mt + Prtm(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
(
g − τ˜ (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)Yrtm(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
)
=:M
rtm
(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
dening the time-one map of money balanes.
Conerning the evolution of expetations, only those will be onsidered whih generate perfet
foresight along orbits. A sequene of prie expetations {pet,t+1}
∞
t=0 is said to satisfy the perfet-
foresight property if a foreast pet−1,t oinides with its assoiated realization pt for every t, i. e.
if
pet−1,t = Prtm(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
holds for every t. To simplify the analysis for the remainder of this setion, assume that
aggregate demand is independent of expeted ination, i. e. ∂D
rtm
/∂θe = 0, and that aggregate
supply is globally invertible with respet to expeted ination.
6
Then, solving (6) for the
expeted prie yields an expliit foreasting rule, dened globally as
pet,t+1 = ψ
∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ) ≡ P
e
rtm
(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ) := p
e
t−1,tAS
e
rtm
(
D
rtm
(
Mt
pet−1,t
)
, λ
)
where ASe
rtm
(y, λ) denotes the inverse of the aggregate supply funtion with respet to expeted
ination. Then, the two mappingsM
rtm
and ψ∗ dene a two-dimensional dynamial system in
money holdings and prie expetations(
Mt+1
pet+1,t+2
)
=
(
M
rtm
(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
ψ∗(M
rtm
(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ), p
e
t,t+1, λ)
)
.
Sine along the orbits of this system, the perfet-foresight property hods, i.e. pet−1,t = pt for
all t, the dynamis an be written equivalently in terms of money and pries as(
Mt+1
pt+1
)
=
(
M
rtm
(Mt, ψ
∗(Mt, pt, λ), λ)
ψ∗(Mt, pt, λ)
)
. (7)
Thus, the existene of the globally dened perfet preditor guarantees well dened foreward-
reursive equilibrium dynamis of pries and money balanes under perfet foresight.
Sine the system is homogeneous of degree one in money balanes and pries, stationary states of
this system fail to exist generially. In suh ases, the appropriate stationary analysis onsiders
so-alled balaned orbits of monetary expansion along whih real alloations of the eonomy
are onstant.
5
If F (z) is isoelasti with elastiity 0 < B < 1, τ˜(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ) ≡ (τw − τπ)B + τπ is onstant.
6
This allows for the more eient notation D
rtm
(mt) whih is used instead of Drtm(mt, θ
e
t,t+1, λ).
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Denition 6.1. An orbit {(Mt, pt)}
∞
t=0 of (7) is alled a balaned path if there exists an m > 0
suh that mt := Mt/pt = m for every t.
Exploiting the homogeneity of the two mappings of (7) desribing the dynamis of nominal
money balanes and pries yields a time-one map for real balanes given by
mt+1 =
Mt+1
pt+1
=
M
rtm
(Mt, ψ
∗(Mt, pt, λ), λ)
ψ∗(Mt, pt, λ)
=
pt
(
Mt
pt
+ g − τ˜ψ∗
(
ASe
rtm
(
D
rtm
(
Mt
pt
)
, λ
))
D
rtm
(
Mt
pt
))
ptASe
rtm
(
D
rtm
(
Mt
pt
)
, λ
)
=
mt + g − τ˜ψ∗(AS
e
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ))Drtm(mt)
ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ)
=: F(mt)
(8)
where
τ˜ψ∗(θ
e) := (τw − τπ)EF (hom(Wrtm(θ
e, λ))) + τπ
denes the average tax rate under perfet foresight with
τ˜(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ) ≡ τ˜ψ∗
(
pet,t+1
P
rtm
(Mt, pet,t+1, λ)
)
.
Beause of the linearity of aggregate demand in mt + g, the system (8) an be written as
mt+1 = (c˜− τ˜ψ∗(AS
e
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ)))
D
rtm
(mt)
ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ)
.
Whenever the eets stemming from the average tax rate τ˜ψ∗ an be negleted (e. g. in the
isoelasti ase), the strit monotoniity of ASe
rtm
implies that F(mt) is stritly monotonially
inreasing and stritly onvex in mt. Sine an inrease of publi onsumption g onstitutes
a left shift of the time-one map, there exists a unique level g⋆(λ) of publi onsumption suh
that exatly two positive xed points exist if and only if 0 < g < g⋆(λ). In this ase, whih is
depited in Figure 12, the lower xed point is asymptotially stable and the upper xed point is
unstable.
7
To exhibit the typial dynamial features, it is informative to onsider the isoelasti
ase treated in the previous setion. One obtains the system
mt+1 =
c˜− τ˜
ASe
rtm
(1, λ)
D
rtm
(mt)
1+
C(1−B)+1
BC =
c˜− τ˜
ASe
rtm
(1, λ)
D
rtm
(mt)
C+1
BC ,
(9)
whih is isoelasti in D
rtm
(mt) with elastiity
C+1
BC
> 1. The root of the dynamial system (9)
evaluated at a positive xed point m is
EF(m) = ED
rtm
(m)
C + 1
BC
=
m
m+ g
C + 1
BC
.
For two-dimensional homogeneous systems, it is known that the stability of the one-dimensional
system (9) is only a neessary ondition for asymptoti stability of balaned paths. Their
analysis requires a separate two-dimensional investigation of stability.
8
7
These results orrespond to the ones of the models with ompetition (Böhm 2010) and eient bargaining
(Böhm & Claas 2012).
8
see Deardor (1970); Böhm, Pampel & Wenzelburger (2005); Pampel (2009)
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Figure 12: Stability and onvergene
Denition 6.2. Let {(Mt, pt)}
∞
t=0 be an orbit of the system (7) and let m be a xed point of
the assoiated one-dimensional system (8). The orbit is said to onverge to a balaned path
assoiated with m if mt = Mt/pt onverges to m and
∆t := Mt −mpt = (mt −m)pt
onverges to zero for t→∞.
The number ∆t measures the (vertial) distane between the orbit and the set of balaned
paths. One an write
∆t+1 = (mt+1 −m)pt+1 =
mt+1 −m
mt −m
pt+1
pt
∆t
=
mt+1 −m
mt −m
ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ)∆t
whih shows that ∆t+1 is linear in ∆t and whih gives the two-dimensional system in (mt,∆t)(
mt+1
∆t+1
)
=
(
F(mt)
F(mt)−m
mt−m
ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(mt), λ)∆t
)
(10)
Due to the skewness of (10), a xed point (m, 0) is asymptotially stable if and only if
∂mt+1
∂mt
= F ′(m) and
∂∆t+1
∂∆t
= F ′(m)ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(m), λ) =
c˜− τ˜
c˜
C + 1
BC
are less than one in absolute value. Both roots are positive. The seond one equals the
rst ∂mt+1/∂mt multiplied by the expeted rate of ination along the balaned path m. The
algebrai expression shows for the isoelasti ase that it is independent of the xed point m
of F and of union power λ. Therefore, the balaned path is asymptotially stable if m is an
asymptotially stable xed point of F , i. e. F ′(m) = EF (m) < 1, and if the expeted rate of
ination is not too large so that the produt F ′(m)ASe
rtm
(D
rtm
(m), λ) is still less than one.
In other words, asymptoti stability of (m, 0) requires that the expeted rate of ination along
the balaned path is bounded by 1/F ′(m). Geometrially speaking, this means that the fore
that pulls an orbit to the set of balaned paths assoiated with m dominates the inationary
fore driving the system away from the path.
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7 Summary and Conlusion
This paper provides a omplete integration of the right-to-manage wage bargaining approah
into a variant of the aggregate supplyaggregate demand model in full generality. It is shown
that temporary equilibria under the right to manage exist under the same set of assumptions
as in the ase of a ompetitive labor market or under eient bargaining (as in Böhm 2010;
Böhm & Claas 2012). Sine the level of union power is a free parameter to be hosen between 0
and 1, the results desribe eonomi senarios of a wide range of possible nonompetitive
situations of distribution of the bargaining power between unions and syndiates. Most impor-
tantly, a full general-equilibrium integration of the right-to-manage approah into a onsistent
monetary maroeonomi model with a ompetitive output market is obtained, haraterizing
ompletely the intermarket feedbak struture. Thus, all maroeonomi eets of the right-
to-manage approah, as opposed to most of the partial-equilibrium analysis of the literature,
are analyzed.
As a onsequene of this integration of the feedbak struture, the omparative-statis prop-
erties for the maroeonomy are derived for the essential state variables: money balanes,
expetations, and union power. While these properties with respet to money balanes and
expetations are qualitatively similar to the ompetitive as well as to the eient-bargaining
model, the paper derives a strong positive impat of union power on the temporary prie. This
dierene arises from the fat that the temporary equilibrium prie is aeted through aggre-
gate supply instead of aggregate demand under eient bargaining, whih ontrasts strongly
with a negative prie impat under eient bargaining.
Due to the opposite prie eet, both aggregate (nominal) prots and the exess wage sum
inrease in bargaining power. From this view point, the bargaining agents would hene prefer
a strong (preisely: a monopolisti) union to maximize both nominal payos. These gains,
however, ome at the ost of lower output and less employment, and beause of the higher
ommodity prie, result in less onsumption of old onsumers and of higher governmental
spendings.
Several extensions and modiations of this model seem to be promising. Symmetri to the
right-to-manage wage bargaining disussed so far, a right-to-work wage bargaining senario an
be onsidered, in whih the union determines the level of employment after a wage rate has
been negotiated. In this ase, the desired (notional) level of employment ould be guaranteed
to all workers, implying a rate of underemployment equal to zero. However, this would indue
a demand side measure of fator usage of the produer dened by the dierene of the level of
employment and the assoiated notional labor demand at the atual real wage.
In the above analysis, the level of bargaining power is assumed to be onstant and exogenously
given. This implies dynamial features, whih are struturally the same as in the ompetitive
and the eient-bargaining settings. It remains an open question to what extent an intertempo-
ral adjustment of bargaining power would lead to interesting and qualitatively dierent eets
for the long-run behavior of the eonomy.
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A Proofs
A.1 Convexity of the Set of Feasible Payos
Lemma A.1. The set of feasible points of the bargaining problem (1) is onvex.
Proof. It sues to show that the payo frontier is onave in the payo spae. To this end,
let (pe, p)≫ 0 be given, let 0 < β < 1, and for i = 1, 2 let(
nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
Li
nf
)
,
Li
nf
)
,Ω
(
pe, pF ′
(
Li
nf
)
, Li
))
be two points on the payo frontier, w. l. o. g. L1 < L2. Due to the strit monotoniity of the
pereived prots, there exists a unique L3 ∈ (L1, L2) suh that
Π
(
p, pF ′
(
L3
nf
)
,
L3
nf
)
= βΠ1 + (1− β)Π2.
Note that nfpF (L/nf )− p
eS(L)L is stritly onave in L beause F (z) is stritly onave in z
and S(L)L is onvex in L. Then, the following equations/inequalities
Ω
(
pe, pF ′
(
L3
nf
)
, L3
)
= pF ′
(
L3
nf
)
L3 − p
eS(L3)L3
= nfpF
(
L3
nf
)
− nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L3
nf
)
,
L3
nf
)
− peS(L3)L3
> β
(
nfpF
(
L1
nf
)
− peS(L1)L1
)
+ (1− β)
(
nfpF
(
L2
nf
)
− peS(L2)L2
)
−
nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L3
nf
)
,
L3
nf
)
= β
(
nfpF
(
L1
nf
)
− peS(L1)L1
)
+ (1− β)
(
nfpF
(
L2
nf
)
− peS(L2)L2
)
−
βnfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L1
nf
)
,
L1
nf
)
− (1− β)nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L2
nf
)
,
L2
nf
)
= β
(
nfpF
(
L1
nf
)
− nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L1
nf
)
,
L1
nf
)
− peS(L1)L1
)
+
(1− β)
(
nfpF
(
L2
nf
)
− nfΠ
(
p, pF ′
(
L2
nf
)
,
L2
nf
)
− peS(L2)L2
)
= β
(
pF ′
(
L1
nf
)
L1 − p
eS(L1)L1
)
+ (1− β)
(
nfpF
′
(
L2
nf
)
L2 − p
eS(L2)L2
)
= βΩ
(
pe, pF ′
(
L1
nf
)
, L1
)
+ (1− β)Ω
(
pe, pF ′
(
L2
nf
)
, L2
)
prove the strit onavity of the payo frontier in the (Π,Ω) spae and thus the onvexity of
the set feasible payos.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. 1. Let (pe, p)≫ 0 be given.
In the boundary ase of no union power λ = 0, the onstraint Ω(θe, α, h
om
(α)) ≥ 0 has to
bind, whih is equivalent to N(α/θe) = nfhom(α). Beause of the strit monotoniity of the
funtions N and h
om
in α and beause of the surjetivity of N , this wage uniquely exists.
Furthermore, W
rtm
(θe, 0) is stritly monotonially inreasing in expeted ination θe.
Let λ > 0. Note rst that (4) implies
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα
=
1− λ
λ
Ω(θe, α, L)
Π(1, α, L/nf)
L ≥ 0,
i. e. for any given expeted rate of ination θe, union utility is nondereasing in the real wage
rate at a solution α of (4). Dierentiating ∂N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α, whih is stated in (4), with respet
to θe and λ yields
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∂α ∂θe
= −
λ
(Ω(θe, α, L))2
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂Ω(θe, α, L)
∂θe︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−S(L)L<0
N˜P (α, θe, λ)
+
λ
Ω(θe, α, L)
d2Ω(θe, α, L)
dα dθe︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−S
om
(L)nfh′
om
(α)>0
N˜P (α, θe, λ)
+
(
λ
Ω(θe, α, L)
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα
−
1− λ
Π(1, α, L/nf)
L
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∂N˜P (α,θe,λ)
∂α
1
N˜P (α,θe,λ)
=0
∂N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∂θe
> 0
and
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∂α ∂λ
=
(
1
Ω(θe, α, L)
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
1
Π(1, α, L/nf)
L
)
N˜P (α, θe, λ)
+
(
λ
Ω(θe, α, L)
dΩ(θe, α, L)
dα
−
1− λ
Π(1, α, L/nf)
L
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂N˜P (α,θ
e,λ)
∂α
1
N˜P (α,θe,λ)
=0
∂N˜P (α, θe, λ)
∂λ
> 0.
Due to urvature and optimality of W
rtm
(θe, λ), the seond derivative ∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2 < 0
has to be negative. Applying the impliit funtion theorem to (4) then implies
∂W
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂θe
= −
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α∂θe
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2
> 0
as well as
∂W
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂λ
= −
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α∂λ
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2
> 0,
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i. e. W
rtm
(θe, λ) is stritly monotonially inreasing in expeted ination and union power.
2. Beause of the upper bound on ∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2
0 < EW
rtm
(θe) =
∂W
rtm
(θe, λ)
∂θe
θe
α
= −
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α∂θe
∂2N˜P (α, θe, λ)/∂α2
θe
α
< 1
whih proves the assertion.
B Calulations Parametri Example  the Isoelasti Case
The isoelasti form of the prodution funtion implies that
F ′(z) = AzB−1, h
om
(
w
p
)
= (F ′)−1
(
w
p
)
=
(
A
w/p
) 1
1−B
,
wL
nfpF (L/nf )
=
F ′(L/nf) (L/nf )
F (L/nf)
= EF
(
L
nf
)
= B,
h−1
e
(L) =
F ′(L/nf)
S
om
(L)
= A(1− τw)n
1−B
f n
1/C
w L
−
C(1−B)+1
C ,
h
e
(θe) =
(
θe
A(1− τw)n
1−B
f n
1/C
w
)− C
C(1−B)+1
= A
C
C(1−B)+1 (1− τw)
C
C(1−B)+1n
C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
f n
1
C(1−B)+1
w (θ
e)−
C
C(1−B)+1 .
Then, for (pe, p)≫ 0 given, the Nash produt an be rewritten as
NP (w,L, λ) =
(
nfpF
(
L
nf
)
− wL
)1−λ
(wL− peS(L)L)λ
= nfpF
(
L
nf
)
(1− B)1−λ
(
B −
θeS(L)L
nfF (L/nf)
)λ
= nfpF
(
L
nf
)
(1− B)1−λ
(
B − B
C
C + 1
θeS
om
(L)
F ′(L/nf )
)λ
= nfpF
(
L
nf
)
(1− B)1−λBλ
(
1−
C
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
)λ
,
subjet to L = nfhom(w/p). This yields, with L = nfhom(w/p),
argmax
w≥0
{NP (w,L, λ)} = argmax
w≥0
{
nfF
(
L
nf
)(
1−
C
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
)λ}
= p arg max
w/p≥0
{
nfF
(
L
nf
)(
1−
C
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
)λ}
= pW
rtm
(
pe
p
, λ
)
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The rst-order ondition for an interior solution then is
0 =
F ′(L/nf ) (L/nf)
F (L/nf)
(
1−
C
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
)
+ λ
C
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
(h−1
e
)′(L)L
h−1
e
(L)
= B −
BC
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
+ λ
BC − (C + 1)
C + 1
θe
h−1
e
(L)
= B −
BC
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
θe
h−1
e
(L)
or
h
e
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
θe
)
= L = nfhom
(
w
p
)
whih is equivalent to
w
p
= F ′
(
1
nf
h
e
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
θe
))
= (nf )
1−B
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)) C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
F ′ (h
e
(θe))
= A(nf )
1−B
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)) C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
(h
e
(θe))B−1
= A
1
C(1−B)+1
(
nf
nw
) 1−B
C(1−B)+1
(
C
C + 1
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
)
1
1− τw
θe
) C(1−B)
C(1−B)+1
= W
rtm
(θe, λ).
The real wage W
rtm
(θe, λ) is an isoelasti funtion in expeted ination with
0 < EW
rtm
(θe) =
C(1−B)
C(1− B) + 1
< 1,
i. e.W
rtm
(θe, λ) is stritly monotonially inreasing, globally invertible and stritly onave with
respet to pe/p. For λ > 0
0 < EW
rtm
(λ) =
λC(1−B)+1
BC
1 + λC(1−B)+1
BC
C(1−B)
C(1− B) + 1
<
C(1− B)
C(1−B) + 1
= EW
rtm
(θe) < 1
implies that W
rtm
(θe, λ) is stritly monotonially inreasing and stritly onave with respet
to λ.
Sine the prodution funtion and the rms' labor demand are as well isoelasti, the aggregate
supply funtion
AS
rtm
(θe, λ) = nfF (hom (Wrtm(θ
e, λ)))
is isoelasti with an elastiity
0 > EAS
rtm
(θe) = EF (z)Eh
om
(α)EW
rtm
(θe) = B
1
B − 1
C(1−B)
C(1− B) + 1
= −
BC
C(1− B) + 1
> −1
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and 0 > EAS
rtm
(λ) > EAS
rtm
(θe) > −1. Therefore, the elastiity of the prie law with respet
to bargaining power is bounded by unity, i. e.
0 < EP
rtm
(λ) =
−EAS
rtm
(λ)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m)
<
−EAS
rtm
(θe)
−EAS
rtm
(θe) + ED
rtm
(m)
< 1.
B.1 Comparative Statis
Sine several partial derivatives are zero under isoelasti prodution and disutility funtions,
the missing omparative-statis eets an be alulated.
Aggregate returns (i. e. gross national produt) are inreasing with respet to all state variables.
EP
rtm
(pe) + EY
rtm
(pe) = EP
rtm
(pe)(1− EAS
rtm
(θe)) + EAS
rtm
(θe)
= EP
rtm
(pe) (1− ED
rtm
(m)) ∈ (0, 1)
EP
rtm
(λ) + EY
rtm
(λ) = EP
rtm
(λ)(1− EAS
rtm
(θe)) + EAS
rtm
(λ)
= EP
rtm
(λ)(1− ED
rtm
(m)) ∈ (0, 1)
Again, all elastiities are bounded by unity. Sine aggregate nominal prots and the wage bill
are onstant multiples of aggregate returns, i. e.
W
rtm
(M, pe, λ)L
rtm
(M, pe, λ) = BP
rtm
(M, pe, λ)Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
resp.
Π
rtm
(M, pe, λ) = (1−B)P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ).
their elastiities are the same as the ones of aggregate returns, i. e.
EΠ
rtm
(M) = EW
rtm
(M) + EL
rtm
(M) = EP
rtm
(M) + EY
rtm
(M) ∈ (0, 1)
EΠ
rtm
(pe) = EW
rtm
(pe) + EL
rtm
(pe) = EP
rtm
(pe) + EY
rtm
(pe) ∈ (0, 1)
EΠ
rtm
(λ) = EW
rtm
(λ) + EL
rtm
(λ) = EP
rtm
(λ) + EY
rtm
(λ) ∈ (0, 1)
i. e. the wage bill and nominal prots are inreasing in all state variables, whereas real prots
Π
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
P
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
= (1− B)Y
rtm
(M, pe, λ)
are inreasing inM , but dereasing in pe and in λ beause of the resp. hanges in the employment
level. This implies that young onsumers earn more, but onsume less if λ inreases. Due to
the prie inrease, old onsumers an aord less units of the ommodity and the government
needs to spend more to nane its onsumption level g. Therefore, all groups of onsumers
suer from redued onsumption.
Conerning the net wage bill, rst note that
EL
rtm
(M) = −Eh
om
EW
rtm
(θe)EP
rtm
(M) =
C
C(1− B) + 1
EP
rtm
(M)
>
C
C(1− B) + 1
1
BC
C(1−B)+1
+ 1
=
C
C + 1
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and
EL
rtm
(pe) = Eh
om
EW
rtm
(θe)(1− EP
rtm
(pe)) = −
C
C(1−B) + 1
(1− EP
rtm
(pe))
> −
C
C(1− B) + 1
(
1−
BC
C(1−B)+1
BC
C(1−B)+1
+ 1
)
= −
C
C + 1
.
Then
EΩ
rtm
(M) =
L
rtm
Ω
EP
rtm
(M)P
rtm
F ′
(
L
rtm
nf
)
+
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(M)
(
BP
rtm
F ′
(
L
rtm
nf
)
−
C + 1
C
peS(L
rtm
)
)
=
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(M)
C(1 −B) + 1
C
W
rtm
+
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(M)
(
BW
rtm
−
C + 1
C
peS(L
rtm
)
)
=
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(M)
C + 1
C
(W
rtm
− peS(L
rtm
)) =
C + 1
C
EL
rtm
(M) ∈ (0, 1)
EΩ
rtm
(pe) =
pe
Ω
(
EP
rtm
(pe)
P
rtm
pe
F ′
(
L
rtm
nf
)
L
rtm
− S(L
rtm
)L
rtm
)
+
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(pe)
(
BP
rtm
F ′
(
L
rtm
nf
)
−
C + 1
C
S(L
rtm
)
)
=
L
rtm
Ω
((
C(1− B) + 1
C
EL
rtm
(pe) + 1
)
W
rtm
− peS(L
rtm
)
)
+
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(pe)
(
BW
rtm
−
C + 1
C
S(L
rtm
)
)
= 1 +
L
rtm
Ω
EL
rtm
(pe)
(
C(1−B) + 1
C
W
rtm
+BW
rtm
−
C + 1
C
S(L
rtm
)
)
= 1 +
C + 1
C
EL
rtm
(pe) ∈ (0, 1)
The net wage bill is inreasing with respet to union power beause the wage bill is inreasing
whereas the reservation wage is dereasing, i. e.
EΩ
rtm
(λ) > 0.
Conerning the omparative statis under eient bargaining, rst note that
EP
e
(M) =
ED
e
(m)
−EAS
e
(θe) + ED
e
(m)
<
1
1− EAS
e
(θe)
and
EP
e
(pe) =
−EAS
e
(θe)
−EAS
e
(θe) + ED
e
(m)
>
−EAS
e
(θe)
1− EAS
e
(θe)
,
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whih implies that
EP
e
(M) + EY
e
(M) = (1−EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(M) ∈ (0, 1)
and
EP
e
(pe) + EY
e
(pe) = EAS
e
(θe) + (1−EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(pe) ∈ (0, 1)
holds. Sine the wage bill and nominal prots are onstant multiples of aggregate returns, i. e.
W
e
(M, pe, λ)L
e
(M, pe, λ) =
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
C(1−B) + 1
C + 1
)
P
e
(M, pe, λ)Y
e
(M, pe, λ)
resp.
Π
e
(M, pe, λ) = (1− λ)
C(1− B) + 1
C + 1
P
e
(M, pe, λ)Y
e
(M, pe, λ),
one an state that
EW
e
(M) + EL
e
(M) = EΠ
e
(M) = EP
e
(M) + EY
e
(M) ∈ (0, 1)
and
EW
e
(pe) + EL
e
(pe) = EΠ
e
(pe) = EP
e
(pe) + EY
e
(pe) ∈ (0, 1).
The eet of hanges of money holdings and prie expetations on the net wage billΩ
e
(M, pe, λ)
an also be alulated.
EΩ
e
(M) =
1
Ω
(
EW
e
L
e
(M)W
e
L
e
− EpeS(L
e
)L
e
(M)peS(L
e
)L
e
)
=
1
Ω
(
(1−EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(M)W
e
L
e
+
C + 1
C
Eh
e
(θe)EP
e
(M)peS(L
e
)L
e
)
=
1
Ω
(
(1−EAS
e
(θe))W
e
L
e
−
C + 1
C(1− B) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−EAS
e
(θe)
peS(L
e
)L
e
)
EP
e
(M)
= (1− EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(M) ∈ (0, 1)
EΩ
e
(pe) =
1
Ω
(
EW
e
L
e
(pe)W
e
L
e
− EpeS(L
e
)L
e
(pe)peS(L
e
)L
e
)
=
1
Ω
(
(EAS
e
(θe) + (1− EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(pe))W
e
L
e
−
(
1−
C + 1
C(1− B) + 1
(1− EP
e
(pe))
)
peS(L
e
)L
e
)
=
1
Ω
(
(EAS
e
(θe) + (1− EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(pe))W
e
L
e
− (EAS
e
(θe) + (1−EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(pe))peS(L
e
)L
e
)
= EAS
e
(θe) + (1− EAS
e
(θe))EP
e
(pe) ∈ (0, 1)
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